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NOTES
drawn statute will restrict judicial discretion within a smaller area than a
broad statute like the Sherman Act. But regardless of the type of statute, a
decision interpreting that statute in the first instance need not be considered
an amendment to the statute by virtue of the theory of separation of powers.46
The feeling that the Court might usurp the legislative authority becomes a
phantom when it is considered that Congress is free to overrule any decision
of the Court if it is so desired. 7 Concomitantly, the practical hardships upon"
the individual litigant and on Congress itself are minimized by this modification. The one chance doctrine would coerce consistency regardless of
knowledge gleaned through experience. Justice Frankfurter's words are
peculiarly apt: "Wisdom too often never comes and so one ought to reject it
merely because it comes late." 48 -The Court must be given a "second chance."

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF REMOVALS OF MUNICIPAL POLICEMEN AND FIREMEN IN INDIANA
An intermittent controversy regarding the proper function of the courts
in reviewing dismissals of municipal policemen and firemen was renewed by
the Indiana Appellate Court in Bishop v. City of Fort Wayne. 1 Judicial concern is invoked by legislation which prohibits the removal of such personnel
except for cause, other than political considerations, after notice and oppor(1950). This extreme position completely saps the vitality of the separation of powers
concept. It is here that separation of powers should apply and demand that a statute be
applied as "intended" until affirmative action by Congress indicates otherwise.
46. See note 34 supra.
47. The most striking illustration of this is the Congressional reversal of May v.
Heiner, 281 U.S. 238 (1930), and three cases, Burnet v. Northern Trust Co., 283 U.S.
782 (1931) ; Morsman v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 783 (1931); McCormick v. Burnet, 283
U.S. 784 (1931) decided on the authority of that case. Two days after these cases were
decided Congress overruled them. Joint Resolution of March 3, 1951, c. 454, 46 STAT. 1516;
GRISWOLD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL TAXATION 168 (2d ed. 1946).
48. Henslee v. Union Planters National Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949)
(Dissenting opinion.).
i.91 N.E.2d 368 (Ind. App. 1950). Marie Bishop, a policewoman for the city of
Fort Wayne, was discharged for misconduct, after a hearing by the Board of Public
Safety. She appealed pursuant to IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-6105 (Burns Repl. 1950), to the
Allen Circuit Court where, over the objection of the city of Fort Wayne, the case was
tried anew on the meritp and the decision of the board reversed, and reinstatement ordered.
On appeal, the Appellate Court was unanimous in support of the circuit court's interpretation of the statute as to reviewing procedure, but felt that contra ruling precedents of
the Indiana Supreme Court were controlling. Therefore, the case was transferred to the
higher court with accompanying reasons for the differing interpretation. The Supreme
Court in affirming found it unnecessary to reconsider its former position. Instead the
court chose to dispose of cause upon grounds that the board had failed to comply with the
statutory requirement that charges sufficiently specific as to time, place, and nature of
the offenses, are to be entered formally on the record of the board. Therefore, since no
lawful charges were filed, the court held the removal proceedings to be arbitrary and
void. City of Fort Wayne v. Bishop, 92 N.E.2d 544 (Ind. 1950).
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tunity for hearing, by the local Board of Public Safety.2 The statutory provision permitting an "appeal" from dismissal by the board was construed by
the Appellate tribunal as prescribing a complete retrial on the merits by the
courts.3 Prior Indiana Supreme Court decisions 4 are to the contrary and
clearly define the province of the judiciary as one of limited inquiry. The
divergent views respecting the nature of the appeal and the scope of judicial
review merit further consideration.
The initial statute,' creating the tenure status, failed to designate a review
procedure. Judicial consideration was not precluded, however, and the appropriate remedy was by action of mandamus to compel reinstatement.6 Since
mandamus historically will not lie to control the legally exercised discretion
of an administrative officer or body,7 the review was correspondingly limited.
It was held not to be the court's prerogative to weigh the evidence and thereby
substitute its judgment for that of the commissioners.' The sole issues before
the reviewing judge were whether there was substantial evidence before the
2. IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-6105 (Burns Repl. 1950) provides: "Every member of fire
and police forces . . . shall hold office until removed by said board. They may be
removed for any cause other than politics, after written notice . . . and opportunity
for hearing is given, if demanded, and the written reasons for such removal shall be
entered on the record of such board." The causes for which removal is justified are
statutorily enumerated as: conviction of any criminal offense, neglect of duty, violation
of rules, neglect or disobedience of orders, incapacity, absence without leave, immoral
conduct, conduct injurious to public peace or welfare, conduct unbecoming an officer,
or other breach of discipline. Exclusive control of fire and police forces is generally
vested in the Board of Public Safety, I D. ANN. STAT. § 48-6105 (Burns Repl. 1950).
For cities of first and second class, a civil service commission is created to administer
a civil service system, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 48-6204-6249 (Burns Repl. 1950). Police and
fire forces are placed under the auspices of a metropolitan police commission in cities
of 10,000 to 35,000 population, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 48-6301-6315 (Burns Repl. 1950).
3. 91 N.E.2d 368 (Ind. App. 1950) at 372, "It seems clear that the statute provides
an independent action for relief from an unwarranted order of an administrative board
and a trial de novo of the issues upon which the order was made," citing Texport Carrier
Corporation v. Smith, 8 F. Supp. 28, 33 (S.D. Tex. 1934).
4. Zellers v. City of South Bend, 221 Ind. 452, 48 N.E.2d 816 (1943) ; Lloyd v. City
of Gary, 214 Ind. 700, 17 N.E.2d 836.(1938) ; City of Elkhart v. Minser, 211 Ind. 20, 5
N.E.2d 501 (1937) ; accord, School City of Peru v. State ex rel. Youngblood, 212 Ind.
223, 7 N.E.2d 176 (1937).
5. IND. AcTs 1905, c. 129 § 160, p. 219.
6. State ex rel. Szweda v. Davies, 198 Ind. 30, 152 N.E. 174 (1926) ; Shira v. State
ex rel. Ham, 187 Ind. 441, 119 N.E. 833 (1918) ; Roth v. State ex r-el. Kurtz, 158 Ind. 242,
63 N.E. 460 (1902).
7. The writ, an extraordinary remedy, issues from a common law court in the name
of the state against a public officer or administrative body to compel action of a nondiscretionary nature. See HIGH, I EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES (3d ed. 1896);
Sherwood, Mandamus to Review State Administrative Action, 45 MIcH. L. REV. 123
(1946). In Indiana, mandamus proceedings have been transformed by statute into the
action mandate, which is commenced by complaint, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 3-2201-2205
(Burns Repl. 1946).
8. State ex r-el. Felthoff v. Richards, 203 Ind. 637, 642, 180 N.E. 596, 598 (1932),
saying, "In short, the court will not correct errors of judgment made during a hearing by
a board of safety in weighing evidence presented to support a cause for dismissal of a
policeman or fireman."
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board upon which to support the decision,0 and to determine the legality of
,the order in terms of fraud, arbitrariness, fairness of the hearing, interpretation of the statute and jurisdiction. 0 Such is the prevailing view in jurisdictions having similar legislation whether the non-statutory review be by action
of mandamus or by writ of certiorari.'"
The present statutory provision for "appeal" was added by amendment
in 1933.
The aggrieved incumbent may invoke judicial aid by filing a complaint in the circuit or superior court, stating the charges against him, the decision of the board thereon, and the demand for relief. Following a provision
concerning the appropriate pleadings and parties, the controversial section
provides:
Any such decision of the board shall be deemed prima facie correct
and the burden of proof shall be on the party appealing. All such appeals shall be tried by the court unless written request for a jury be
made . . . and shall be heard de novo upon the issues raised by the
charges upon which the decision of the board was made. . . . With-

in ten days after service of summons the board shall file in said court
a full, true and complete transcript of all papers, and entries and
other parts of the record relating to such particular case. .

.

. Each

party may produce such evidence as it may desire, relevant to the
issues and the court upon such appeal shall review the record and
decision of such board.13
9. The "substantial evidence test," included in the formula of review is often invoked
but its exact limits and proper application are by no means uniform. See Universal
Camera Co. v. NLRB, 71 Sup. Ct. 456 (1951) ; See Davis, Scope of Review of Federal
Administrative Action, 50 COL. L. REv. 599, 600 (1950); Stason, "Substantial Evidence"
in Administrative Law, 89 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1026 (1940). Even in Indiana the test has
had various formulation; thus, "If there is any substantial evidence to support the order,"

New York C. R.R. v. Public Service Commission, 212 Ind. 329, 332, 7 N.E.2d 957,
958 (1937); "If wholly unsupported by evidence," Heflin v. Red Front Cash & Carry
Stores, Inc., 225 Ind. 517, 523, 75 N.E.2d 662, 665 (1947); "If there was substantial
evidence which tends to support the legal cause," Stiver v. State ex rel. Kent 211 Ind.
380, 384, 1 N.E.2d 1006, 1007 (1936).
10. State ex rel. Felthoff v. Richards, 203 Ind. 637, 180 N.E. 596 (1932), stating
that the court will inquire to see: (1) that the cause of dismissal bears a reasonable
relation to the accused's fitness to hold the position in question, (2) that the cause comes
within the meaning of the statute as construed by the court, and (3) if the hearing
though regular in form, is in truth not a fair hearing; State ex rel. Szweda v. Davies,
198 Ind. 30, 152 N.E. 174 (1926) ; State ex rel. Julian v. Board of Metropolitan Police
Commissioners of the City of Logansport, 170 Ind. 133, 83 N.E. 83 (1907).
11. DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 484-488, (5th ed. 1911) ; THROOP, PUBLIC
OFFICERS § 398 (1892).
However, elsewhere, as in Indiana presently, the method of
review applicable to removals of municipal policemen and firemen has frequently been
prescribed by statute. See, Removal of Municipal Policemen and Firemen in New Jersey,
62 N.J.L.J. 71 (1939) ; Kern, Judicial Review of the Municipal Civil Service Commission,
18 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 46 (1940).
12. IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-6105 (Burns Repl. 1950).
13. Ibid. It is further provided that the court, if it finds that the decision should not
in all things be affirmed, "shall make a general finding, setting out, however, sufficient
facts to show the nature of such proceeding and the court's decision thereon, and shall
render judgment either reversing the decision of the board, or ordering the same to be
modified as the court shall find and adjudge to be proper. . . ." The statute attempts
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This provision, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Lloyd v. City of
Gary,14 rendered nebulous the change in the scope of review theretofore accorded in the action of mandate. The contention that the trial de novo terminolog-y denoted an action independent in substance was rejected. The court
characterized the so-called "appeal" as in the nature of a mandatory injunction to seek reinstatement, and thus, a mere alteration in the form of the
review proceedings. The grounds of reversal previously recognized remained
the only concern of the court on review. 15 In City of Elkhart v. Minser
it was said that to attach the requirement of full review of both law and fact
to the provision would render it unconstitutional as imposing administrative
duties upon the courts in violation of the separation of powers clause. 6
The Appellate Court in the Bishop case questioned both the merits and
necessity of so restrictive an interpretation of the appeal provision.' 7 In a
to prevent an appeal from the judgment of the circuit court, but such appeal may not
be denied, Wilmont v. South Bend, 221 Ind. 538, 48 N.E.2d 649 (1943) ; cf. Warren v.
Indiana Telephone Co. 217 Ind. 93, 26 N.E.2d 399 (1940).
14. 214 Ind. 700, 17 N.E.2d 836 (1938). Following dismissal of plaintiff, a policeman, the circuit court received evidence solely upon the issue of "legality" of the board's
action. On appeal to the Supreme Court, plaintiff contended that the statute prescribed
submission to the jury of the same issues upon which the decision of the board was made.
The court rejected the argument as against the weight of authorities, citing City of Elkhart v. Minser, 211 Ind. 20, 25, 5 N.E.2d 501, 503 (1937) ; School City of Peru v. State
ex rel. Youngblood, 212 Ind. 225, 7 N.E.2d 176 (1937).
The court's reliance upon the Youngblood case may be questioned because of differences in the applicable statutes. The court was there reviewing the dismissal of a school
teacher by the board of education under IND. ANN STAT. § 28-4308 (Burns Repl. 1950),
which provides that the decision of the board shall be final, in contrast to the language
of the present statute. See Board of School Trustees v. Moore, 218 Ind. 286, 33 N.E.2d
114 (1941).
15. Lloyd v. City of Gary, 214 Ind. 700, 703, 17 N.E.2d 836, 838 (1938). See Zellers
v. City of South Bend, 221 Ind. 432, 48 N.E.2d 816 (1943) ; City of Frankfort v. Easterly,
221 Ind. 268, 46 N.E.2d 817 (1943), rehearingdenied, 221 Ind. 268, 47 N.E.2d 319 (1943)
Coleman v. City of Gary, 220 Ind. 446, 44 N.E.2d 101 (1942).
16. 211 Ind. 20, 5 N.E.2d 501 (1937). Article 3 Section 1 of the Indiana Constitution
provides: "The powers of government are divided into three separate departments; the
legislative, the executive and the judicial; no person charged, with official duties under
one of these departments, shall exercise any of the functions of another, except in the
constitution expressly provided." For similar avoidance of unconstitutional imposition
of administrative duties upon the courts, see State Board of Medical Registration and
Examination v. Scherer, 221 Ind. 92, 46 N.E.2d 602 (1943) ; In Re Northwestern Indiana
Telephone Co., 201 Ind. 667, 171 N.E. 65 (1930). For a general historical treatment of
the separation of powers, see Sharp, The Classical American Doctrine of "Separation of
Powers", 2 U. OF CHi. L. REV. 385 (1935).
"17. 91 N.E.2d 368 (Ind. App. 1950). The court recognized that under proper
legislative direction review may be limited to questions of law; but this does not imply
that more complete review may not be provided. In several jurisdictions, under similarly
phrased statutes, a complete new trial has been granted in the revie.ving court. Edwards
v. Civil Service Commission, 227 Ia. 74, 287 N.W. 385 (1935); Hall v. Putthoff, 252
Ky. 370, 67 S.W.2d 948 (1948) ; Kearins v. Ziegewer, 135 N.J.L. 119, 50 A.2d 865 (1946) ;
cf. Costa v. Justices of Dist. Court, 305 Mass. 85, 25 N.E.2d 172 (1940), where the trial
judge, without hearing new evidence, was held authorized to reweigh the evidence from
the record; but cf. Denver R.G.W. R.R. v. Public Service Commission, 98 Utah 431,
100 P.2d 552 (1940).
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per curiam opinion the court regarded the language as clearly imposing a
requirement that the determination of fact be concluded by the court without
li itation by the administrative determinations. It was reasoned that otherwise the statutory right to a jury trial would become meaningless.18 The
poceedings were analogized to appeals from justice of the peace courts1" with
t1 e exception that under the present statute the administrative conclusions are
prima facie correct. And since the proceedings related to removal for cause,
were adversary in nature, and required a determination of facts and decision
thereon, it was deemed sufficiently judicial to avoid constitutional defect.
The constitutional objection to a full review of the action of the Board
of Public Safety is predicated upon the assumption that the board functions
ii an administrative capacity when removing policemen and firemen,2" a
position which finds support in several jurisdictions.21 Others, while admitting that the board is generally an administrative agency, maintain that the
removal process is sufficiently judicial in nature to permit review by direct
2
appeal. 2
It is established terminology in Indiana that the removal of public officers
18. In Lloyd v. City of Gary, 214 Ind. 700, 704, 17 N.E.2d 836, 838 (1938), the
court commented upon the provision, which authorizes a jury trial, if requested, concluding
that since the issues presented questions of law only, the jury could serve solely in an
advisory capacity upon some question of controverted fact that might arise in equitable
cases triable by the court as provided for in InD. ANN STAT. § 2-1204 (Burns 1933). It
was reasoned that the title of the statute was not broad enough to constitute an amendment to the civil code with respect to jury trials, and the legislature did not intend that
questions of law were to be submitted to the jury.
19. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 5-1001-1008 (Burns Repl. 1946) (governing appeals from
justice of the peace courts). The causes tried by the court on appeal are limited to those
tried by the justice, Flanagan v.' Reitmier, 26 Ind. App. 243, 59 N.E. 389 (1901);
Pritchard v. Bartholomew, 45 Ind. 219 (1873). The cause is not to be tried on errors
but upon the merits of the original papers, Hughs v. Cincinnati I. & L. R.R., 50 Ind. App.
278, 98 N.E. 317 (1912) ; Briton v. Fox, 39 Ind. 369 (1872). The trial is governed by the
same rules as those governing the proceeding before the justice, Davis v. King, 180 Ind.
387, 103 N.E. 98 (1913) ; Phillipps v. Cox, 61 Ind. 345 (1878).
20. Zellers v. City of South Bend, 221 Ind. 452, 48 N.E.2d 816, 817 (1943), saying,
"The board of public works and safety of a city in determining questions presented by
charges against employees acts in a ministerial capacity and as a fact finding board."
21. Re Harold Fredricks, 285 Mich. 262, 280 N.W. 464 (1938), saying that the
commission in removing for cause, though judicial in a sense and sometimes referred to
as judicial, remains primarily administrative, and not subject to appeal to the courts.
An attempt to provide for a complete review of law and facts would be unconstitutional,
Aurora v. Schoeberlein, 280 Ill. 496, 82 N.E. 860 (1907).
22. Selectmen of Milton v. Judge of District Court, 286 Mass. 1, 189 N.E. 607
(1934) ; Driscoll v. Burns, Mayor, 213 Mass. 493, 495, 100 N.E. 640 (1913), saying, "A
statute which requires a court to review the decision of questions like these, upon petition
after notice to all parties and a hearing, according to judicial procedure, does not impose
the performance of executive duties." See Jennings, Removal From Public Office In /
Minnesota, 20 MiNn. L. RE. 721 (1935) ; Removal of Municipal Policemen and Firemen
in New Jersey, 62 N.J.L.J. 71 (1939).
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is a judicial function23 while the discharge of governmental employees involves the exercise of executive powers.24 Because of the impossibility of
precisely classifying policemen or firemen exclusively as public officers or
employees, a solution to the present constitutional problem which would utilize
this judicial dichotomy is unsatisfactory. Some decisions have held that
policemen are public officers under the common criterion that they exercise
a portion of the sovereign power.2 5 Yet, other holdings affix the label of
employee and require suit in contract to recover accrued wages following
wrongful discharge. 26 It is obvious that policemen possess characteristics of
each category.2 7 Therefore, to assert that because the personnel involved are
employees, the removal is administrative and thus may not be imposed upon
the courts, is to engage in meaningless labeling and questionable logic. Legislation should not be invalidated on this tenuous basis.
Nor does the nature of the public functions performed by the Board of
Public Safety indicate with certainty whether the agency is exercising administrative or judicial powers. 28 Considering only the process of removal,
the board would seem to be acting judicially. 29 This is plausible in light of
23. Hyde v. Board of Commissioners of Wells County, 209 Ind. 245, 255, 198 N.E.
333, 334 (1935), saying the removal of an officer for cause and after hearing, whether
exercised by the appointing power or hnother body, is essentially a judicial function.
See also Board of Commissioners of Knox County v. Johnson, 124 Ind. 145, 24 N.E. 148
(1890) ; State ex rel. Carlson v. Harrison, 113 Ind. 434, 16 N.E. 384 (1887).
24. Tucker v. State, 218 Ind. 614, 35 N.E.2d 270 (1941) ; cf. Humphrey's Executor
v. United States, 295 U.S. 622 (1935) ; see THROOP, PuLIC OFFICERS § 361 (1907).
25. Shelmadine v. City of Elkhart, 75 Ind. App. 493, 129 N.E. 878 (1921); Hopewell v. State, 22 Ind. App. 489, 54 N.E. 127 (1899) ; City of Lafayette v. Timberlake, 88
Ind. 330 (1892).
26. State ex rel. Palm v. Brazil, 225 Ind. 308, 73 N.E.2d 485 (1947), petition for rehearing denied, 225 Ind. 318, 74 N.E.2d 917 (1947) ; City of Evansville v. Maddox, 217
Ind. 39, 25 N.E.2d 321 (1940); Shanks v. City of Washington, 212 Ind. 38, 7 N.E.2d
968 (1937) (firemen) ; City of Peru v. State ex rel. McGuire, 210 Ind. 668, 199 N.E. 151
(1936) (firemen).
27. For comment concerning the confusion in classifying a given position as that
of a public officer or employee see, GOODNOW, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES 225 (1905); HART, AN INTRODUCTION To ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
116 (2d ed. 1950).
28. See Pillsbury, Administrative Tribunals, 36 HARV. L. REv. 405 (1923). The
author rejects as invalid numerous tests which are frequently proposed by courts in
distinguishing administrative from judicial adjudication. He concludes that the true test,
if there be one, lies neither in the department exercising the power nor in the form of
the proceeding, but rather in the character of the act. See also Brown, Administrative
Commissions and The Judicial Power, 19 MINN. L. REv. 261 (1925).
29. By analogy the board of county commissioners is vested with both administrative
and judicial powers but it is not necessary that the board in a given instance shall act
entirely in one capacity or the other. Hyde v. Board of Commissioners of Wells County,
209 Ind. 245, 198 N.E. 333 (1938). If the board is acting judicially, an appeal to the
courts may be had, but if the body was functioning administratively the courts will limit
their inquiry to whether the board acted within its legal jurisdiction. State ex rel. Sink
v. Circuit Court of Cass County, 214 Ind. 323, 15 N.E.2d 624 (1938) ; Potts v. Bennett,
140 Ind. 71, 39 N.E. 518 (1895). No discernible criterion has been provided for determining in what capacity the board is acting in a particular situation.
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the recognized doctrine that judicial powers may be delegated to municipal
officers without violating the separation of powers clause.30 However, viewing the entire function of the board in providing adequate and efficient police
and fire protection, it is manifest that the removal power is only one of the
incidental means of effectuating a larger responsibility. 3 Hence, a dilemma
is also presented by 'this approach.
Although the courts have construed strictly the Indiana separation of
powers clause3 2 writers have expressed doubt that the various powers of
government are susceptible of such exact definition as to justify the invalidation of legislation because of logical nonconformity to a' priori conceptions. 3
Whatever view is accepted, it must be conceded that there are insurmountable
difficulties in ascertaining definitely the nature of the board's removal power.
Hence, to permit the function to be categorized as judicial and, therefore, subject to full review would not seem to violate the spirit of the separation of
powers doctrine. 4 This seems even more valid in view of the tendency to
uphold legislation where at all possible. 35
However, to conclude that the legislature could constitutionally enact a
provision requiring a new and independent trial is not to assert that it did so
30. Snarls, City Clerk v. State ex rel. Trimble, 201 Ind. 88, 166 N.E. 270 (1929) ;
Livengood v. City of Covington, 194 Ind. 633, 144 N.E. 416 (1924); Baltimore Etc.
R.R. v. Town of Whiting, 161 Ind. 228, 68 N.E. 266 (1903); City of Terre Haute
v. Evansville Etc. R.R., 149 Ind. 174, 46 N.E. 77 (1897); Waldo v. Wallace, 12
Ind. 569 (1859). Thus, it would seem impossible to say with certainty for constitutional
purposes that the Board of Public Safety is not acting judicially.
31. Pillsbury, Administrative Tribunals, 36 HARv. L. REV. 405 (1923), concluding
at 420, "The test of administrative or judicial character is whether the power or act in
question is reasonably necessary or incidental to the proper carrying out of an executive
or judicial function."
32. Tucker v. State, 218 Ind. 614, 35 N.E.2d 270 (1941) ; Peden v. Board of Review,
208 Ind. 213, 195 N.E. 87 (1935) ; State ex rel. Black v. Burch, 226 Ind. 445, 80 N.E.2d
614 (1948) ; but cf. Petition for Appointments of Magistrates of Beech Grove, 216 Ind.
417, 24 N.E.2d 773 (1940) ; Board of County Commissioners v. State ex r-el. Brown, 147
Ind. 476, 46 N.E. 908 (1897) ; City of Indianapolis v. State ex rel. Barnett, 172 Ind. 472,
132 N.E. 165 (1909) ; State ex rel. Buttz v. Marion Circuit Court, 225 Ind. 7, 72 N.E.2d
225 (1946).
33. See Davis, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in InVest Virginia-A Study
of Separation of Powers,44 W. VA. L.Q. 270 (1937). See Sharp, The Classical American
Doctrine of "The Separation of Powers," 2 U. OF CHr. L. REV. 385 (1938), at 436, "The
functions of government cannot, however, be simply or perfectly classified and apportioned to different organs of government. Blending has from the first been to some
extent approved and relied on, in securing an effective balance in government." See
BONDY, SEPARATION OF GOVERNMENTAL POWERS 76 (1893).
34. In this view the problem is not purely theoretical, but requires that a realistic
approach be maintained. See Fuchs, Ai; Approach to Administrative Law, 18 N.C.L. REV.
183 (1940), expressing the view that it is a separation of the tasks of government not
logically-defined functions, which is to be maintained. Perhaps, the nature of the act is
attributable to historical rather than logical reasoning.
35. State v. Gerhardt, 145 Ind. 439, 451, 44 N.E. 469, 473, (1896), admonishing that
"It is only when made to appear clearly, palpably, and plainly and in such manner as to
leave no reasonable doubt or hesitation in our minds that a statute violates some provision
of the constitution that we can declare it void."
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in the statute here involved. The difficulty is enhanced by the fact that the
appeal provision contains inconsistencies and the terms employed lack uniform
meaning. The phrase trial de novo is susceptible of varied definition especially
where it is used to describe a method of judicial review of administrative
action.3 6 Militating against the conclusion of the Appellate Court is the statutory direction that a complete transcript of the record be filed and that the
"court shall review the record and decision of such board."3 7 Construing this
language in conjunction with the authorization to receive evidence the
court might well find that the legislature intended to restrict the reviewing
court to the taking of additional evidence only, and in that sense conduct a
trial de novo. 38

Under this procedure it is feasible to further conclude that

the legislature intended a judicial deference to the board's determination of
facts. Unless unsupported by substantial evidence in the record or invalidated
by additional evidence taken by the court, these findings would be sustained."9
36. The term used in its normal connotation would indicate a judicial determination
of a cause on the merits, upon evidence taken by the court. But the courts are prone to
imply some self-limitation on review. Thus, in N.Y.C. & St. Louis R.R. v. Singleton,
207 Ind. 449, 454, 190 N.E. 761, 763, (1934) it was said, "A proceeding in a trial court to
review an order of the public service commission, is an action de novo as distinguished
from appeal; but it does not follow that such a proceeding is de novo in the sense that a
trial court hears and determines on its merits the cause which was heard and determined
by the public service commission." See Denver R.G.W. R.R. v. Public Service Commission, 98 Utah 431, 100 P.2d 552 (1940) ; Fowler v. Young, 77 Ohio App. 20, 65 N.E.2d
399 (1945); but cf. Texport Carrier Corp. v. Smith, 8 F. Supp. 28 (S.D. Tex. 1934).
See Kearney, The Problem of De Novo Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 14
NOTRE DAME LAW. 233 (1939).
37. An argument most emphasized by the Appellate Court was to the effect that
there was no provision for forwarding a transcript of the record of the hearing, and
therefore the court of necessity must determine the facts anew, 91 N.E.2d 368, 369 (Ind.
App. 1950). However, the statute expressly provides for filing of the transcript by the
defendant city, supra, and such filing is mandatory, City of Gary v. Yaksich, 90 N.E.2d
509 (Ind. 1950).
38. For a similar statutory interpretation to this effect of IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 54-429442 (Burns Repl. 1951) which provides for judicial review of Indiana Public Service
Commission orders in the form of an action to vacate the order, see Public Service
Commission v. City of Laporte, 207 Ind. 462, 193 N.E. 668 (1935). Although provision
is made for forwarding a transcript of the record to the reviewing court, additional
evidence may be heard. N.Y.C. & St. Louis R.R. v. Public Service Commission, 209
Ind. 466, 199 N.E. 573 (1936). However, it would seem to be a logical corollary that
evidence adduced at the hearing and properly placed in the record should not be retaken
on review. Pittsburg Etc. R.R. v. Backus, 154 U.S. 461 (1894). Such an interpretation would attach meaning to the provision granting jury trial. If the proceeding be in
the nature of a mandatory injunction the jury could be utilized to try issues of fact
raised by this additional evidence in conformance with INn. ANN. STAT. § 2-1204 (Burns
1933).
39. This may be said to be the general scope of review of administrative determinations of fact in Indiana. N.Y.C. R.R. v. Public Service Commission, 212 Ind. 329,
7 N.E.2d 957 (1937) ; Russell v. Johnson, 220 Ind. 649, 46 N.E.2d 219 (1943) ; Smith v.
Lippman, 222 Ind. 261, 53 N.E.2d 127 (1944); Board of Zoning v. Wheaton, 118 Ind.
App. 38, 76 N.E.2d 597 (1948) ; Warren v. Indiana Telephone Co., 217 Ind. 93, 26 N.E.2d
399 (1940). Although perhaps only applicable to state administrative agencies and not
to the municipal level, the Indiana Act of 1947 governing administrative adjudication
adopts a similar scope of review. IND. ANN. STAT. § 63-3018 (Burns Supp. 1949). See

NOTES
If this interpretation of the statute be valid, the issue next presented is the
extent to which the courts should review the administrative conclusions based
upon these findings.
The Supreme Court's position in the Lloyd case also appears sound respecting the recognition by the courts of admihistrative discretion and judgment which is exercised in reaching these conclusions. The legislative vesting
of such discretion in the board is consistent with the commissioners' familiarity
with standards of fitness and capacity required of policemen and firemen. It
follows that the purpose of the appeal section was not to usurp this conferred
discretion but to permit resort to the courts in cases of abuse or error of law.40
Thus, under either interpretation allegations of fraud, arbitrariness, or fundamental unfairness at the hearing call for inquiry by the reviewing judge.41
Perhaps the problem resolves itself into an endeavor to attain the proper
balance in the relationship between the administrative and judicial branches
of government. 42 Obviously the underlying policy of the enactment is to
prevent indiscriminate dismissals of policemen and firemen with each political
change in the municipal administration.4 3 EVitness and capacity rather than
politics are to govern continuance of employment. Sufficient control by the
judiciary to insure adherence to this policy is necessary. Nevertheless, other
factors warn against overzealous intervention on the part of the courts. The
public has an interest in efficient and adequate fire and police protection.
The Board of Public Safety is unduly hampered in serving that interest if inNathanson, Recent Statutory Developments in State Administrative Law, "33 IOWA L..
252 (1948).

Generally, see Issacs, Judicial Review of Administrative Findings, 30 YALE

L.J. 781 (1921) ; REP. Arr'Y GEN. Comzif. AD. PROc. 75, 87 (1941).
40. City of Elkhart v. Minser, 211 Ind. 20, 23 N.E.2d 501, 503 (1937), saying, "The
court will not undertake to control the discretion of such boards in making orders in the
administration of the affairs of the state so long, as the orders are not tainted with fraud,
capriciousness or illegality." See Marx, A Note on Review of Discretion, 87 U. PA. L.
REV. 954 (1939) ; Dickinson, Judicial Control of Official Discretion, 22 Am. POL. ScI.
REv.275 (1928).
41. Such are grounds for judicial control independently of statutory authorization.
Coleman v. City of Gary, 220 Ind. 446, 44 N.E.2d 101 (1942) ; Roth v. State ex rel.
Kurtz, 158 Ind. 212, 63 N.E. 460 (1902); City of Peru v. Youngblood, 212 Ind. 223,
7 N.E.2d 176 (1937). In the Coleman case the court declared, in discussing review of
administrative conclusions, "while the courts will not interfere with the exercise of
discretion by the commission in such a case as this, and will not weigh evidence which
the commission has heard and which has some reasonable relation to the fitness and
capacity of the person who has been demoted, it is the duty of the court to declare void
the action of such commission . . . where there has not been a fair hearing accorded
such officer. . . . It is not sufficient that the commission follow the formal procedure
provided by statute and the rules of the commission. The law requires more than mere
formality. It requires a valid cause assigned for demotion and a fair hearing in which
evidence tending to support the decision of the commission is heard and considered."
Coleman v. City of Gary, supra, at 460, 44 N.E.2d at 105.
42. See LANDIs, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 142 et seq. (1938); Stone, The
Common Law in the United States, THE

FUTURE OF THE

ComtMoN LAW 136, 146 (1937).

43. Felthoff v. Richards, 203 Ind. 637, 180 N.E. 596 (1932) ; Roth v. State ex rel.
Kurtz, 158 Ind. 292, 63 N.E. 460 (1932).
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competent personnel are retained without the power to remove them. 4 4

It

would seem that the court should be cautious in interfering with the internal
administration of another department. 45
A divergence of view respecting the statute is easily understandable in
view of the conflicting phraseology. Until that situation is remedied it would
seem preferable to attribute to the legislature an intent to secure a rational
division of functions between the administrative agency and the judiciary.
It is believed that the method and scope of review suggested in this discussion
would attain that objective.

EFFECT OF THE TAFT-HARTLEY AND ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACTS ON SCOPE OF REVIEW OF
ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS
In granting enforcement of an NLRB order the Second Circuit rejected
the contention that the scope of judicial review of the Board's findings of
fact had been broadened by the Taft-Hartley and Administrative Procedure
Acts.' Judge Learned Hand pointed out that had this been contemplated
Congress would not have adhered to the old formula that administrative findings of fact were to be sustained if supported by substantial evidence. He
concluded that Congress had intended merely to codify previous law. Certiorari was granted to resolve a conflict with a contrary decision of the Sixth
Circuit.

2

In Universal Camera Co. v. NLRB, 3 the Supreme Court acknowledged
that the scope of review under the Wagner Act originally extended to an
examination of the record to determine whether the Board's findings of fact
were supported by substantial evidence such as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to sustain a conclusion. 4 The Court felt, however, that judicial
44. See HART, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 111 (2d ed. 1950). The
author concludes that in cases involving the internal administration of governmental
organizations, the courts will apply rules of private law only to the extent that detriment
or inefficiency in the agency's performance of its function will not result. GOODNOW,
ADMINISTRATION LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (1900), aptly labeled this factor as the
"official relation."
45. City of Gary v. Yaksich, 90 N.E.2d 509, 511 (Ind. 1950), saying "In proceedings
for removal or discharge of a policeman, the protection of the public is a matter of
paramount importance, exceeding perhaps the individual interests concerned." See
DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND SUPREMACY OF LAW 265 (1927).
1. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 179 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1950).
2. Pittsburg S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 180 F.2d 731 (6th Cir. 1950), aff'd, 71 Sup. Ct. 453
(1951).
3. 71 Sup. Ct. 456 (1951).
4. The Wagner Act provided: "The findings of the Board as to the facts, if supported
by' evidence shall be conclusive." 48 STAT. 926 (1934), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)
(1946). However, in Washington, V. & M. Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142 (1937),
the Court interpreted "evidence" to mean "substantial evidence." In Consolidated Edison
Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938), the Court further elaborated the rule, laying

